Selected Bibliography For The Ethics of Analytic Engagement

Faculty Retreat
February 26, 2017

KEYWORDS: Ethics; Act/Action; Aim/Goal/*Telos*; Responsibility; Speech/Articulation; Avow/Avowal; Account/Accountability/Judgment; Commitment; Desire/Wanting; Value(s); Acknowledge/Acknowledging

Aristotle (2004). *Nicomachean Ethics*. Trans, FH Peters. The Barnes and Noble Library of Essential Reading. New York: Barnes and Noble.

> "Every art and every kind of inquiry, and likewise every act and purpose, seems to aim at some good: and so it has been well said that the good is that at which everything aims."

Altieri, C. (1996). The values of articulation: Aesthetics after the aesthetic ideology. In *Beyond Representation: Philosophy and Poetic Imagination,* ed. R. Eldridge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 66–89.

> "Articulation is the making visible what it is that one wants to be represented by––whether that be an effort to evoke one's one emotions or an effort to fix some phenomenon so that others can see why one cares about it or can do some work because of how the particular gets encoded in the sign system."
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> "For ultimately articulation is not simply a modification in language, it involves a modification in selves who have to interpret why they find satisfaction in it and who have to indicate what consequences might follow from that act of identification."

Altieri, C. (2015). *Reckoning with the imagination: Wittgenstein and the Aesthetics of Literary Experience*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

> "The art object…is not simply an avowal of feeling but a taking of responsibility, by which the subject also provides an accounting of how its particular perspective makes a difference in its mode of self-awareness."

Benjamin, J. (2004). Beyond doer and done to: an intersubjective view of third-ness. *Psychoanal. Q.,* 73:5-46.

> "In the doer/done-to mode, being the one who is actively hurtful feels involuntary, a position of helplessness. In any true sense of the word, our sense of self as subject is eviscerated when we are with our 'victim', who is also experienced as a victimizing object. An important relational idea for resolving impasses is that the recovery of subjectivity requires the

recognition of our own participation. Crucially, this usually involves surrendering our resistance to responsibility, a resistance arising from reactivity to blame. When we as analysts resist the inevitability of hurting the other—when we dissociate bumping into their bruises or jabbing them while stitching them up, and, of course, when we deny locking into their projective processes with the unfailing accuracy of our own—we are bound to get stuck in complementary two-ness."

Butler, J. (2005). *Giving an Account of Oneself*. New York: Fordham.

"This brings us closer to an understanding of transference as a practice of ethics. Indeed, if, in the name of ethics, we (violently) require that another do a certain violence to herself, and do it in front of us by offering a narrative account or issuing a confession, then, conversely, if we permit, sustain, and accommodate the interruption, a certain practice of nonviolence may follow. If violence is the act by which a subject seeks to reinstall its mastery and unity, then nonviolence may well follow from living the persistent challenge to egoic mastery that our obligations to others induce and require."

"Haven't we, by insisting on something non-narrativizable [about our selves], limited the degree to which we might hold ourselves or others accountable for their actions? I want to suggest that the very meaning of responsibility must be rethought on the basis of this limitation; it cannot be tied to the conceit of a self fully transparent to itself."

Chetrit-Vatine, V. (2014). *The Ethical Seduction of the Analytic Situation: The Feminine-Maternal Origins of Responsibility for the Ot*her. London: Karnac.

"Matricial space is to do with the mother, the father, and with the adult world, occupying a position of ethical asymmetry in relation to the child. Now, this matricial space is created by the very fact of the offer of analysis, right up until the end of the analysis, by the very existence of the analyst's person defined as that in him which allows him to position himself as responsible for the other, as the one who has within him, and who is, this matricial space for the other: the ethical subject."

Friedman, L. (1997). Ferrum, ignis, and medicina: Return to the crucible. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 45: 21-36.

"Well, consider this: analytic treatment comes about, in the first place, because of the analyst's attitudes. There is nothing else to make treatment happen. If treatment does something unusual to people, then we can learn about people by picking out the attitudes that make treatment happen, and especially by watching how the attitudes sit together and squirm together to get the job done."

Friedman, L. (2007). The delicate balance of work and illusion in psychoanalysis. *Psychoanalytic Quarterly* 76:817–833.

> "We are specialists in dangerous illusions. Everything in treatment happens in and about illusions. Most of its profit, all of its disasters, its high seriousness, its moral and spiritual riskiness, the bitterness and fatigue of both parties, the need for professional comradeship that draws us together …—all come from the fact that psychoanalysis is a procedure of encouraging illusory expectations."

Gadamer, H.–G. (1991). *Plato's Dialectical Ethics: Phenomenological Interpretations Relating to the* Philebus. New Haven: Yale.

> "Speech, in its primordial form, is part of a shared having to do with something. As an articulating declaration about something, it makes the thing it speaks about manifest as something; but its goal is not that the thing addressed in this way should be discovered. Rather, the real point of this making manifest has to do with carrying out the shared process of making provision for something."

Gentile, J. (2015). Parrhesia, Phaedra, and the polis: anticipating psychoanalytic free association as democratic practice. *Psychoanalytic Quarterly* 84: 589-624.

> "Although psychoanalytic free association may tilt toward the private and intimate, while free speech tilts toward the public (in terms of where lines are drawn for what is exposed), both straddle borders between private and public. There is simply no free speech that is strictly private; it all inhabits a dialectical space, a space of mediation. And this dialectic, like those between speaker and hearer, mind and body, freedom and constraint, is as essential to the practice of free speech in psychoanalysis as it is to democracy."

Gentile, J. (2016). *Feminine Law: Freud, Free Speech, and the Voice of Desire*. London: Karnac.

> "There is, after all, an irony at the core of both the First Amendment and psychoanalysis's fundamental rule: Both imply that freedom is the rule, that constraint is the exception. But unbounded freedom is a myth. Constraints, far from the exception, are the keystone upon which freedom––the freedom of symbolic expression––becomes possible."

Greenberg, J. (2015). Therapeutic action and the analyst's responsibility. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 63:15–32.

> "And yet the patient in front of us—Civitarese's patient is a good example—is very real, and her crisis is very real. This means that the analyst's responsibility to act, to deal effectively with the patient's suffering in one way or another, is also very real. The responsibility cuts two ways, both of them palpable presences in our consulting room. First, we are responsible for

acting in ways that will contribute to our patients' well-being. And at the same time we feel responsible to a particular method for accomplishing this. Both responsibilities have unconscious as well as conscious elements; consciously the patient is a person who has come to us seeking help, and our method is one that we believe offers the requisite kind of help. Unconsciously the patient plays a role in the constantly shifting landscape of our internal world; occasionally we get a glimpse of the role that he or she plays, only to find that our grip on awareness is elusive. And at the same time our responsibility to a method is shaped both by our conscious belief in its efficacy and by our transferentially loaded commitment to the people and institutions that have contributed to our development as psychoanalysts."

Hirsch, I. (2008). *Coasting in the Countertransference*. New York: The Analytic Press.

"Analysts' level of comfortable self-interest always operates in some tension with the best interest of patients, and this conflict exists regardless of any given analyst's personality or preferred theoretical allegiance."

"Analysts' economic dependency on patients leads to an inherent and profound conflict between self-interest and patient interest, and this conflict always has the potential to severely compromise analytic work. Indeed, I believe that analysts' financial concerns reflect the most vivid example of this conflict, and I still suggest that analysts' anxiety about income is the greatest contributor to compromised analyses."

Kirshner, L. (2012). Towards an ethics of psychoanalysis: a critical reading of Lacan's Ethics. *J Am Psychoanal Assoc* **60**: 1223-1242.

"When a patient undertakes to freeze his desire or sustains a conviction that he has found his true desire, he may be close to delusion, enacting the merger of self with ideal self, and a dangerous acting-out may be at hand. Perhaps Antigone is an example of this tragic process in which self-certainty of the object of desire spills into delusion and self-destruction…We might conclude that for an analytic ethics the path of desire should retain to the end its ambiguous, tempting, and unfinished character without a defined or normative stopping point, because that is the essence of having a subjective life, as J. Lear compellingly reminds us. And this vital movement should be reflected in the patient's affect, sense of well-being, and purpose, not in any conventional accomplishments, or standards of health, as Lacan insists."

Kristeva, J. (2014). Reliance, or maternal eroticism. *J Am Psychoanal Assoc* **62**: 69-86.

"Maternal eroticism emerges in this foreignness, this regression, this "state of emergency in life." The various logics of maternal reliance, developed over the course of a mother's life, testify to that eroticism; they reactivate its dynamics and transmit its traces. And what if *this* was it: what if the

passionate 'desire to conceive' tries (just as the rejection of motherhood refuses) to go beyond settling the score with the mother's mother, denying castration and capturing the father's penis (indeed the phallus), all on this side of the mirror stage? The 'horizon' of the Thing, in the subject/object interval, evokes what Sophocles, in *Antigone*, calls 'Até': the paradoxical frontier, prior to law, a fascinating and nonetheless agonizing place. It is 'agonizing' for a consciousness emerging into the 'psychic revolution' of materiality, from which the ego works to hide and defend us. 'Até'. For Hegel and Lacan, this is the beginning of ethics." [Note: Ate is madness, a passionate going beyond the Law]

Lacan, J. (1992). *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis,*
1959–1960, ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. D. Porter. New York: Norton.

"The deep dissatisfaction we find in every psychology—including the one we have founded thanks to psychoanalysis—derives from the fact that it is nothing more than a mask, and sometimes even an alibi, of the effort to focus on the problem of our own action—something that is the essence and very foundation of all ethical reflection."

"An ethics essentially consists in a judgment of our action, with the proviso that [the judgment] is only significant if the action implied by it also contains within it, or is supposed to contain, a judgment, even if it is only implicit. The presence of judgment on both sides is essential to the structure."

"The question of the Sovereign Good is one that man has asked himself since time immemorial, but the analyst knows that it is a question that is closed. Not only doesn't he have that Sovereign Good that is asked of him, but he knows there isn't any. To have carried analysis through to its end is no more nor less than to have encountered that limit in which the problematic of desire is raised."

Leclaire, S. (1998). On the ear with which one ought to listen. In *Psychoanalysing: On the Order of the Unconscious and the Practice of the Letter*, trans. P. Kamuf. Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press.

"One may thus see the double requirement imposed on the psychoanalyst: on the one hand, he must have at his disposal a system of reference, a theory that can permit him to order the mass of material he gathers without prior discrimination; on the other hand, he must set aside any system of reference precisely to the extent that adherence to a set of theories necessarily leads him, whether he likes it or not, to privilege certain elements…Thus, a question is posed that cannot be avoided: *how can one conceive a theory of psychoanalysis that does not annul, in the very fact of its articulation, the fundamental possibility of its practice?*"

Lear, J. (2000). *Happiness, Death, and the Remainder of Life*. Cambridge: Harvard.

> "In my reading, Freud introduces 'death' in much the same way that Aristotle introduces '*the* good': as an enigmatic signifier that is supposed to give us the goal of all striving. Really, we have no better understanding of what Freud mans by 'death' than we do of what Aristotle means by '*the* good'. Each is injected into our thought in the hope of allowing us to organize our experience in such a way as to see all striving as directed toward *that*. But there is no real content to *that*. In this way, Freud attempts a seduction in very much the same sense that Aristotle does."

Lear, J. (2003). The idea of a moral psychology: The impact of psychoanalysis on philosophy in Britain. *International Journal of Psychoanalysis* 84:1351–1361.

> "[H]ow can we make sense of an internalized figure who, on the one hand, remains an other, yet, on the other hand, is a figure whose outlook is one with which I can identify? How does the endorsement of this other's outlook become a genuine expression of my outlook? Or, even less strongly, even if I don't identify with this internalized other, how can my intrapsychic interactions with this figure lead to an outcome that is genuinely mine? What is it about a dynamic intrapsychic interaction with internal figures which leads to a resolution to act that genuinely makes it *my* resolution? Tricky questions; but only the most arid and dead approaches to philosophy would rule *a priori* that there is no answer because the situation is impossible. But, as soon as we admit that it is possible, we have to admit that psychoanalytic concepts––such as internalization, internal object, working through–– become important in working out adequate moral psychology."

Renik, O. (2003). Standards and standardization. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 51(Suppl.): 43–55.

> "Customarily in psychoanalytic circles we speak reverentially of case-specific factors, of the uniqueness of the clinical moment, and we look with great skepticism upon generalizations that might threaten to efface the complexity of these particulars. 'It depends on the individual' might well be a motto emblazoned on the psychoanalytic coat of arms. There are many colleagues for whom *technique* is in itself a dirty word because it is understood to denote a rigid code of behavior that would make them insensitive to their patient's individuality. And yet we realize that responsible clinical practice requires us to think about what we are doing and to develop, if possible, principles that we can apply across cases and across moments to guide ourselves toward optimal patient care."

Rieff, P. (1959). *Freud: The Mind of the Moralist*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

> "The age of psychological man has merged into one characterized equally by its therapies and by its tortures. We are possessed by the transgressive in sacred order, as earlier fanatics were possessed––but in a different way. Psychological men are possessed by the most transgressive and original of all fantasies: that they can command themselves, which is tantamount to being uncommanded. But there is, always and everywhere, someone to obey and someone to transgress. We are never uncommanded, though we may be disobedient."

Schafer, R. (1976). *A New Language for Psychoanalysis*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

> "We shall give up the idea that there are special classes of processes that prepare or propel mental activity, that is to say, classes that are qualitatively different from the mental activity they prepare or propel; for now everything is an action."

Schafer, R. (1983). *The Analytic Attitude*. New York: Basic Books.

> "In action language there are no personified and autonomous mental entities, emotional or otherwise. Nouns and adjectives give way to verbs and adverbs. Far from being merely a stylistic change, action language establishes an entirely different view of existence or of what it is to be a person. Persons are no longer regarded as the arenas and resultants of mental forces; they are their own actions and modes in which they performed these actions. Their identities reside in what can be said in a general way about their actions. Action, it must remember, is not restricted to overt behavior and conscious thinking."

Wilson, M. (2012). The flourishing analyst, responsibility, and psychoanalytic ethics: response to Kirshner. *J Am Psychoanal Assn* **60**: 1251-1258.

> "Let's return to where we started and revisit the question of analytic flourishing. The story we can now describe about the happy, flourishing analyst is filled with ironies that should not obscure an underlying truth: the flourishing analyst is the analyst who is not flourishing, and the happy analyst is the analyst who is not happy. Given the basic working conditions the analyst inhabits, the analyst, as a lacking and therefore desiring being, will stumble. He will misunderstand. He will unwittingly impose and occasionally demand or insist. Thus, the analyst who excellently fulfills his function-as-analyst is the analyst who *fails* to fulfill his function excellently…But this is only part of the paradoxical story of excellent functioning, because manifestations of the analyst's lack are also sources of the analyst's good fortune."

Wilson, M. (2013). Desire and responsibility: the ethics of countertransference experience. *Psychoanal Q* **82**: 435-476.

> "No doubt, for most of us, our everyday clinical self partakes of certain basic psychoanalytic values: honesty, tact, open-mindedness, and the like. We might think of these as psychoanalytic virtues. But from the point of view of Lacan's *Ethics*, the virtuous analyst is not one who is temperate or open-minded, tactful, or prudent. Rather, the virtuous analyst takes responsibility for wanting to act in these ways in the first place. Otherwise, tact can become insensitivity and open-mindedness can turn into intolerance. This is the essence of Lacan's ethics of desire: nothing should be taken for granted."

Wilson, M. (2020). *The Analyst's Desire: The Ethical Foundation of Clinical Practice*. Bloomsbury Academic Press.

> "That moment in which the stranger first comes to the analyst's door and knocks will never, no matter what, be filed down through talk into something totally smooth. Runnings one's fingers over the planed surface of a life will always find a splinter, and not only one. The story … or rather stories that are told will never entirely cohere. Even remotely. This is not only how it should be. This is how it is. There is one moment, then another, and then yet another. This incoherence is part of the very nature of the psychoanalytic engagement. The splinters felt and the stories told are held together by style and commitment––a dedicated way of being––not by narrative. This caretaking attention, this desire, from the analyst to the patient, is for the latter's well-being. The analyst's offer of analysis––an offer that is alive during every session, from the first to the last––places the analyst in a position of ethical responsibility for the other––the other that inheres in the patient's speech, in the patient as other person, and for the otherness that inheres in the intersubjective relation and in the manifestations of the unconscious each participant brings to the analytic work."

JAPA Section: Ethical Implications of the Analyst as Person—December 2016

Kite, J.V. The fundamental ethical ambiguity of the analyst as person.

> "Ethics for our purposes isn't a moral abstraction, but is importantly and profoundly object-related. It's *personal*. It's how we *relate* to ourselves and think our unconscious thoughts. As I think of it, the ethical surface has specifically to do with how we *characteristically* relate to others, and has indelible roots in our histories. This approach makes ethics the *basis* for an analytic engagement from the beginning, not a latecomer to the party, and a chaperon at that. Ethics *is* the party, or, more precisely, the bewildering array of unconscious object relationships that each analyst *brings* to the party, from the beginning."

Morris, H. The analyst's offer.

> "In calling on us to acknowledge the ethical weight of the [analyst's] offer [of analysis], I'm calling on us to peel back this deceptively bland-sounding label. What is our fundamental practice, our praxis, ethically speaking? Let me propose this: for starters, underlying everything else, psychoanalysis is the practice of *living the real*. Psychoanalysis is the practice of *living the real* at the level of our basic existential situation in relation to one another. The ethics of psychoanalysis, most primally, is the ethics of a human encounter that stages both new possibilities of intimacy and new necessities of separateness."

Wilson, M. The ethical foundation of analytic action.

> "If the *id* or the *it* is the unthought, the unrepresented, the unknown, then Freud's ethical maxim *where it was there I shall become* applies not only to the patient, but more importantly, for our purposes, to ourselves. As psychoanalysts, in moments of 'forgetting', of 'fading', we must then take up that absent place so as to be poised in a futural, anticipatory attitude open to what emerges next. If we refuse this lack, this absenting, then the opportunities for the patient to respond and speak are blocked, foreclosed. But they are blocked only until we come back to this absent place, in which the psychoanalytic dialogue has a chance to get going again. Most crucially, if the analyst struggles with the fact of his own dislocation, and elides his ethical responsibility for this otherness within, then the patient will be left alone, alienated not only from the analyst, but from his own desire and the shadows of its insistent presence. In such a case there is nothing for the patient to avow, and no coming to ask of crucial questions."

Kattlove, S. Acknowledging the 'analyst as person': a developmental achievement.

> "Clinical examples are like buying clothes from a catalogue: they look great on the models, but not always on us. What we don't learn and can't learn from these vignettes is who the individual analyst is and why that technique works for that person and why it might not be such a good fit on us. We see a snippet of the treatment, massaged to fit in particular theory. The result for the candidate I was, and at times for the graduate analyst I now am, is the sense that I'm doing things wrong, because my treatments don't look like that. And when I try to make my treatments look like that, or take a theory or approach that my supervisor has suggested directly into my office with my patient, I generally miss the patient."

Moss, D. Me here, you there––Now what? Commentary on Kite, Morris, Wilson, and Kattlove.

> "How can we comfortably read about ethics without feeling ourselves reading from a text or book––or worse yet, a textbook––whose major premise might be that psychoanalytic ethics cannot properly be read from a

book? We are stuck. But we're stuck in a good place, the same place the particular analyst and patient are stuck––not quite knowing what the words "real," "naked," "person," [and "lack"] mean, while also knowing that whatever they mean, they will definitely play major roles keeping what we think and what we do ethical."

Post-Lacanian Works on Ethics

Badiou, A. (2001). *Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil*. trans. P. Hallward. London: Verso.

"...since the power of a truth is that of a break, it is by violating established and circulating knowledges that a truth returns to the immediacy of the situation, reworks that sort of portable encyclopedia from which opinions, communications and sociality draw their meaning."

"'Keep going', do all you can to persevere in that which exceeds your perseverance…Seize in your being that which has seized and broken you."

"Our suspicions are first aroused when we see that the self-declared apostles of ethics and of the 'right to difference' are clearly *horrified of any vigorously sustained difference*. For them, African customs are barbaric, Muslims are dreadful, the Chinese are totalitarian, and so on. As a matter of fact, the celebrated 'other' is acceptable only if he is a *good* other––which is to say what, exactly, if not *the same as us*?"

DeKesel, M. (2005). There is no ethics of the real: a common mis-reading of Lacan's seminar, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis. Presentation given at University of Ghent.

"'The ethics of psychoanalysis' is not an ethics of the real. If it were so, this would perhaps make psychoanalysis more popular, more accepted by current psychology and other social sciences. For, as the title of 'ethics of the real' suggests, psychoanalysis could then be perceived as being founded in the *real* state of things, in a state modern science claim to deal with. Contrary to this, the approach of psychoanalysis is thoroughly 'superficial'. The analyst cannot found any of his claims in the real in the way that science does (or, at least, as science is perceived to). He cannot give the certainty the sciences pretend to offer. Instead, he operates on the superficial surface of the signifier in an attempt to confront his patient with 'himself,' as with something that, even on that surface, is absent without being elsewhere – really – present. But precisely in this lack of 'real ground' and persevering in this superficiality, psychoanalysis finds its ethical 'raison d'être'. Its ethics, being an'ethics of desire', must remain superficial. It is the only way of giving space to modern man's 'essence', i.e. to his absence of any essence. In other words, it's the only way to give space to his desire. And giving space to desire, this is what ethics is about."

Neill, C. (2011). *Without Ground: Lacanian Ethics and the Assumption of Subjectivity*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

> "[T]he notion of ethics which can be drawn from Lacan is such that the ethical can be reduced neither to an example nor to a prior prescription. It is such that what constitutes ethics or the ethical must reside always with the singular subject in question. Phrased otherwise, ethics, for Lacan, is reducible neither to a model which might be glorified, inflated or simply transposed beyond the particular context in which it might have occurred, nor to an abstraction and inscription which bears no, or no longer bears, any unique relation to any one context. The ethical cannot even be taken to reside in the particular context viewed as an empirical or objective event. The ethical can only ever come to be as that which is assumed by the subject and, thus, only ever *is* for that subject."

Ruti, M. (2011). *The Singularity of Being*. New York: Fordham University Press.

> "Sublimation undermines the seamlessness of social reality. Because the objects we endow with the Thing's nobility contain a trace of the real, they automatically challenge the notion that the Other's reality principle is all we have got. In this sense, it is exactly the fact that reality does not fully correspond to itself––that it is always punctured by the energies of the real––that forges an opening for the reinvention of (personal and social) ideals, values, and systems of representation. Or, to approach the matter from the opposite direction, it is only when something of the real is admitted to the space of the symbolic that it becomes possible to reach beyond the reality principle…[S]ublimation is not what tempers prohibited passions by directing their unlawful energies into something more lawful, as Freud saw it. And it is not what turns passion into beauty in the conventional sense. Rather, it strives to clear a stage on which ideals, values, and systems of representation that are considered illegitimate and devoid of worth become legitimate and worthwhile."

Santner, E. (2001). *On the Psychotheology of Everyday Life: Reflections on Freud and Rosenzweig*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

> "[M]y ultimate hope is that when we read Freud and Rosenzweig together we will find ourselves more deeply aware of and open to what I refer to as *the psychotheology of everyday life*…[T]his awareness is an achievement that can be understood along the lines of the psychoanalytic conception of 'working through', the affect-laden process of traversing and dismantling defensive fantasies, the structured undeadness that keeps us from opening to the midst of life and the neighbor/stranger who dwells there with us. To put it in somewhat different terms, I am interested in the ways in which both Freud

and Rosenzweig give us the means to think the difference between holding ourselves responsible for *knowing* other minds and accepting responsibility for *acknowledging* other minds in all their insistent and uncanny impenetrability."

Zupancic, A. (2000). *Ethics of the Real: Kant and Lacan*. London: Verso.

"At the very moment when we thus formulate terror in its most radical form, however, we suddenly recognize a strange structural homology between *terror* and *ethics*. If ethics is always correlative to choice, we might say that the closer we come to the ethical Act, the closer we are to the most radical instance of choice––the one we have designated as the core of terror. In the final analysis, Sophie's Act is the ethical act *par excellence*: to save at least one child, she has taken upon herself an impossible possible choice, and with it full responsibility for the death of her other child."

Zizek, S. (1989). *The Sublime Object of Ideology*. London: Verso.

"We can now see why the maxim of psychoanalytic ethics as formulated by Lacan ('not to give ground relative to one's desire') coincides with the closing moment of the psychoanalytic process. The 'traversing––going through––the fantasy': the desire with regard to which we must not 'give ground' is not the desire supported by the fantasy, but the desire of the Other beyond fantasy. 'Not to give ground on desire' implies a radical renunciation of all the richness of desires based upon fantasy-scenarios."

"But the case of so-called 'totalitarianism' demonstrates what applies to every ideology, to ideology as such: the last support of the ideological effect (of the way an ideological network of signifiers 'holds' us) is the nonsensical, pre-ideological kernel of enjoyment. In ideology 'all is not ideology (that is, ideological meaning)', but it is this very surplus which is the last support ideology."